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STUDENT NOTES
guilty of violations, but there was no evidence that the officers had
knowledge of these previous violations, or reasonable grounds of
suspicion. The court held in this case that there was not sufficient
grounds to sustain the defendant's request that the question of entrap-
ment be submitted to the jury. The words of the court as to reasonable
suspicion are: "That an agent manufactures an offense against the
law and then incites a person against his will to commit that offense
for the puprose of prosecution is the gist of the defense of entrapment.
"When any evidence of this situation appears, the question whether
such a person was approached as an innocent man, or one suspected
of vtplating the law, becomes important. * * * There is no evidence
here, however, that the agent manufactured the crime or induced its
commission. The lack of evidence then that the agent did not have a
belief or suspicion of a violation of the law becomes immaterial."
This statement of the rule of law as to the defense of entrapment is
a novel one.
In the great majority of similar cases it has been at least tacitly
admitted that proof of reasonable suspicion and good faith on the part
of the government agents was proper if not necessary. Grounds for
reasonable suspicion have been proven as a guide to the origin of
intent. Whether or not the agents of the government acted in good
faith upon reasonable suspicion has been used as one of the criteria
for determining the legality or illegality of the means used to entrap
the person. According to the above rule, the court looks first to the
origin of intent. They determine whether the accused was induced
to commit the acts. Finding these in favor of the defendant, the
court then allows him to raise the question of reasonable suspicion.
Otherwise it is immaterial.
The conclusion seems to be that this case is not in harmony with
the majority of cases. They support the rule that proof of reasonable
suspicion that the law is being violated is essential to rebut the plea
of entrapment where more than mere request for violation is made
by government agents. The rule of this case requires that the defend-
ant prove all other elements of entrapment before the question of
reasonable suspicion can be brought into 'issue. Thus, the case of the
government becomes less burdensome, and that of the accused becomes
more so. J. DAuwnq BoND
EVIEcE-DYMG DscLARATIoNs.-In a recent Kentucky case, the
Court of Appeals admitted as dying declarations statements made by
deceased and held that the statement "Oh, Lordy, I am going to die,
I can't live long this way," was sufficient predicate for admission of
dying declarations, in view of the nature of the wound. Cochran v.
Comnonwealth, 236 Ky. 284, 33 S. W. 230 (1930).
The law in Kentucky on admission of dying declarations Is well
settled and is in accord with the general weight of authority. The
court in the above case stated the law as "consciousness on the part
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of the declarant that he was dying or was actually in extremis may
be inferred not only from his statements, but also from the nature
of the wound and other circumstances. * * * The deceased was
shot in the abdomen and bullets pierced his intestines in fourteen
places. While he lived five days, the wound was of such a character
that deceased must have recognized its seriousness. It is not necessary
that deceased say in so many words that he is conscious of impending
death; but it is sufficient if the judicial mind is convinced by legally
sufficient evidence that deceased believed he was about to die."
Dying declarations have been admitted since the early 1700's, and
early customs sanctioned the special trust reposed in death bed state-
ments. Shakespeare expressed ill verse the opinion of the times in
King John, V, 4 Melun, about 1595:
"Why should I then be false, since it is true
"That I must die here and live hence in truth?"
Necessity is given as the reason for admitting in evidence the
unsworn testimony of the deceased. The necessity of having witness'
only available trustworthy statement is evident in those cases where
there are no other witnesses to the transaction.
At first, dying declarations were admitted in both civil and
criminal cases, but very early the courts limited the admissions to
criminal cases only. This limiting of the admissions was due to a
chapter on homicide by Sergeant East, 1803 Sergt. East, Pleas of the
Crown, 1, 353, and in 1860 Justice Redfield in his edition of Green-
leaf's Treatise gave it the widest credit and led to its widest accept-
ance. Greenleaf on Evidence, Redfield Ed., Vol. 1, section 156, editorial
note. The rule now being that dying declarations are admissible only
in cases of homicide where the declarant's death is the subject of the
charge and only that part of the declaration that pertains to the facts
leading up to, concerning or attending the injurious act which resulted
in declarant's death.
Some courts have put a further limitation on the admissions
by applying the "Opinion Rule." Wigmore, Evidence Vol. 3, section
1434, says that the Opinion Rule cannot be rightfully applied to
dying declarations. In cases where the witness is living, all the facts
can be ascertained from his testimony and the jury can form its
own opinion but in cases where the witness is dead, all the facts are
not available and his opinion may be every thing when so few facts
are had. Also, this rule gives rise to rather arbitrary decisions. It is
one thing to exclude some parts of a testimony that are not relevant
or that could not be used if the witness were on the stand, but it iS
quite a different matter to reverse on some arbitrary matter to which
the jury is fully competent to give proper weight. Kentucky applies
the opinion rule and cases have been reversed because it was held
incompetent to admit in dying declarations such a trivial statement
as, "He shot me for nothing." Coblins v. CommonweaZth, 12 Bush 271
(1876) and Jones v. Oommonwealt, 20 Ky. Law Rep. 355, 46 S. W.
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217 (1898). Also, applied in U. H. v. Veitch, Fed. Gas., No. 16, 614
(1803) and about a dozen states.
The guarantee of the truth of the declarant's statement is the
solemnity of the occasion; where every motive to falsehood is silenced
and every hope of this world is gone.
"Statements of a wounded person are competent as a dying
declaration where the proper preliminary foundation for its introduc-
tion has been laid upon the theory that the consciousness of impending
death removes all incentive to state an untruth or fail to state the
whole truth, and dispenses with the ordinary necessity for an oath and
cross-examination." Whitehead v. Commonwealth, 200 Ky. 440-225
S. W. 93 (1920).
This guarantee is recognized universally and courts to further
limit the exceptions to the Hearsay Rule have set out certain criteria
to be followed. The deceased must be actually in extremis, must have
a sense of impending death, apprehension of immediate death, abandon-
ment of hope of recovery, and in possession of mental capacities.
These mental and physical conditions are held necessary in all
jurisdictions with the exception of apprehension of immediate death.
This is the most mooted question of any arising in the consideration
of the general subject of dying declarations. Kentucky adopts this
view along with the majority.
All the above rules are set out in the case of Walston v. Common-
wealth, 16 B. Mon. 15 (1855):
"The court stated that the English authorities fully establish, as
a principle of the common law, the admissibility of dying declarations
as evidence; but it seems to be well settled that they are admissible,
as such, only in cases of homicide, where the death of the deceased is
the subject of the charge, and the circumstances of the death the
subject of the dying declarations. That the principle upon which they
are admitted rests upon the ground of public necessity to preserve the
lives of the community in bringing the manslayer to justice. That the
argument against their admissibility is that they form a very dangerous
description of testimony, made frequently under feelings of revenge,
calculated to affect the truth and accuracy of the statements, and that
the rule which admits them, not only deprives the accused of the
right of cross-examination, but also of the constitutional right "to meet
the witnesses face to face" that are produced against him. That the
answer to the objection made to the policy of the rule admitting dying
declarations is that such evidence must, from the necessity of the case,
be admitted to identify the accused, and to establish the circumstances
from which the death resulted; otherwise the guilty would frequently
escape, where no third person witnessed the transaction, for the want
of testimony to designate the perpetrator of the homicide, and to
explain the manner in which it occurred. And that, as these declara-
tions, to be admissible, must be made in extremis, under a solemn
sense of impending dissolution, it is considered that the constant
expectation of immediate death will silence every motive to falsehood,
remove every feeling of revenge, and the mind will be induced by the
most powerful considerations to adhere strictly to the truth; the awful
situation of the individual creating, in legal contemplation, an obliga-
tion equal to that which is imposed by an oath administered in a
court of justice."
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We have seen in general, in order to admit statements of a person
who has been killed by another in evidence on the trial of that other
person for the killing, as dying declarations of the deceased, such
statements must have been made when the latter was in extremis,
under a sense of impending death, and the sense or apprehension must
have been that such death would be almost immediate, and all hope
of recovery had been abandoned, and the decedent was in reasonable
possession of his mental faculties. The question which naturally
follows is, how is such a state of affairs to be established or proved?
Several methods are used by the courts, the most common being
the statements of the deceased and the surrounding circumstances
combined. It is also sufficient if the declarant by his statements
expresses his recognition of impending dissolution. And further it
is sufficient to prove such a state of affairs, in absence of a statement,
by circumstances such as, the seriousness of the wound, the opinion
of attending physician, sending for a priest or minister, arranging his
business, or witnesses.
"The law does not require as a condition to the competency of
statement or a dying declaration, that the Injured party shall, In
express words, declare that he is about to die, or that he shall make
use of equivalent language. His recognition of impending dissolution
may be shown in this way but the law does not limit it to this mode
alone. People v. Commonwealth, 87 Ky. 487, 9 S. W. 509 (1888).
This view is also shown in Mattox v. 7. S., 146 U. S. 140 (1892);
Gerald v. State, 12$ Ala. 6, 29 So. 614 (1901); and People v. Lem Dea,
132 Cal. 199, 64 Poe 265 (1901) says, "where taking all the evidence
together, and considering all the attending circmstances" it was
sufficiently shown that the deceased made the dying declarations
under a sense of impending death.
Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. 3, section 1442, says, "We may avail
ourselves of any means of inferring the existence of such knowledge;
and if in a given case the nature of the wound is such that the
declarant must have realized his situation our object is sumciently
attained. Such is the settled judicial attitude."
The above statement is followed to the letter in Kentucky and the
principal case cites It as authority and quotes it in the opinion.
Kentucky courts in a few instances have made some rather unique
holdings. Sending for a doctor has been allowed in evidence to show
that deceased entertained a hope of recovery which would disqualify
his statements as dying declarations. Methedy v. Commonwealth, 14
Ky. Law Rep. 182, 19 S. W. 977 (1892). This is only followed in
Kentucky, 56 A. L. 1. 414 e. Where the circumstances were such that
would show deceased was in extremis it merely meant that deceased
wished to have temporary relief. State v. Evans, 124 Mo. 397, 28
S. W. 8 (1894).; McQueen v. State, 103 Ala. 12, 15 So. 824 (1894).
In one instance Kentucky has allowed statements to be admitted
as dying declarations where the declarant expressed a hope of reeovery
to his family but the circumstances showed that he must have known
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that death was near at hand. This is unusual and against the weight
of authority and only used in Kentucky, 6 Bush 312, Minnesota, 122
Minn. 91., 141 N. W. 1113, and Pennsylvania, 2 Ashm. (Pa.) 41.
A few jurisdictions have allowed dying declarations in cases of
abortion where death occurred. In these jurisdictions it was let in
because the offense may be prosecuted for felonious homicide and
come under the rule that dying declarations are allowed only in cases
of homicide. 87 Ky. 487, 9 S. W. 609 (1888).
The law on dying declarations is well settled throughout the United
States and England, and Kentucky is In accord except in one or two
minor details as set out above. The holding in the principle case
would be the same in all jurisdictions. F. H. HANnKES
